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Abstract 
For many years the importance of sharing 
information on cybersecurity risks, vulnerabilities, 
and incidents has been understood.  Organizations 
working in isolation are at a disadvantage when 
facing the types of threats existing in today’s Internet 
environment.  Informal information sharing has been 
conducted for many years.  More formal information 
sharing organizations were created in response to the 
1998 Presidential Decision Directive-63.  More 
recently, Executive Order 13691 called for the 
creation of information sharing and analysis 
organizations beyond the critical infrastructures and 
led to the creation of a standards organization to 
create standards, guidelines, and other documents to 
assist in the creation of information sharing 
organizations.  This paper will discuss the history of 
information sharing in the United States and will 
explain the potential impact for states and 
communities.  The importance of developing state 
and community information sharing organizations 
will be discussed along with the challenges in 
establishing them.  
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1. Introduction  
 
It is not hard to understand the benefit of 
information sharing and analysis in defending 
computer systems and networks.  An attack 
discovered on one organization in a given sector 
might, and in fact most likely can, serve as a warning 
to others in the same sector.  It is reasonable to 
assume that, for example, if an attack is occurring on 
a financial institution with a new vulnerability, it is 
very likely that others will be or already are also 
being attacked via the same vulnerability.  If the first 
institution that detects the attack warns the other, 
many that might not have discovered the 
vulnerability until much later can address the 
problem at a much earlier point in time.  It is also 
easy to imagine how sharing between sectors could 
also serve to provide similar early warning of attacks 
on an operating system or application that is used in 
multiple sectors.  It might also provide an indication 
of an “inordinate interest” in an organization or 
geographic jurisdiction (such as a state or 
community) which might foreshadow a pending 
attack on the initial organization or upon others in the 
same sector or geographic region.  Organizations that 
keep knowledge of attacks and unusual activity to 
themselves are actually doing a disservice to the 
security community at large.   
The benefit in sharing of cybersecurity 
information has been recognized since the early days 
of the Internet.  The earliest attempt to formalize a 
method to share cybersecurity information during a 
national incident occurred as a result of the Internet 
Worm released by Robert Morris.  During the 
incident pockets of individuals around the country 
were attempting to address the incident and develop a 
defense for the worm.  There were no established 
procedures or any formal method to share and 
coordinate information and efforts.  After the event, 
meetings were held to discuss how best to handle 
similar situations in the future and in 1988 the 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) at 
Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) was formed.  
The mission has evolved over time and many of the 
incident response functions now are part of the US-
CERT located with the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) while the CERT/CC (CERT 
Coordination Center) housed at CMU now researches 
security vulnerabilities in software products and 
works with software vendors to develop methods to 
resolve discovered vulnerabilities. They also develop 
tools to assist organizations in conducting forensic 
examinations and in analyzing vulnerabilities. [1] 
The next major advancement in cybersecurity 
information sharing organizations was the publication 
of Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63 (PDD-63) 
in February, 1998.  The subject of this PDD was 
broadly critical infrastructure protection.  The stated 
intent of the PDD was to “assure the continuity and 
viability of critical infrastructures.” [2]  To do this, 
“the United States will take all necessary measures to 
swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerability to both 
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physical and cyber attacks on our critical 
infrastructures … especially our cyber systems.” [2]  
Of importance to the discussion of information 
sharing, the PDD directed the FBI to expand its 
efforts to create a “national warning and information 
sharing system”  and to “serve as a national critical 
infrastructure threat assessment, warning, 
vulnerability, and law enforcement investigation and 
response entity.” [2]  It further encouraged the critical 
infrastructures to establish private sector sharing and 
analysis centers.  These centers are now known as 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs).  
There are currently 24 member organizations in the 
National Council of ISACs (NCI) primarily covering 
the critical infrastructures. 
Executive Order (EO) 13636, published in 
February, 2013, has the stated goal of improving the 
security and resilience of US critical infrastructure. 
To achieve this goal, the EO directs governmental 
agencies to partner with the owners and operators of 
critical infrastructure in order to “improve 
cybersecurity information sharing and collaboratively 
develop and implement risk‐based standards.” [3] 
The first major contribution of EO 13636 is to 
increase the volume, timing, and quality of 
cybersecurity information sharing. To this end, 
DHS’s Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (ECS) was 
expanded to include all 16 critical infrastructure 
sectors.   ECS was also improved to provide near real 
time information sharing.  Additionally, unclassified 
reports of threats to the US homeland are produced 
and disseminated in a timely manner to US private 
sector entities.  Similarly, classified reports are made 
available to authorized critical infrastructure entities. 
The second major contribution of EO 13696 was 
ordering the creation of a technology neutral and 
voluntary risk-based Cybersecurity Framework.  The 
Cybersecurity Framework was developed by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) using voluntary consensus based standards.  
The objective of the framework is to provide 
standards, guidelines, and practices that are both cost-
effective and applicable across all critical 
infrastructure sectors. [4] 
Additionally, EO 13636 also contains provisions 
to protect privacy and civil liberties, establishes a 
program to promote and incentivize the adoption of 
cybersecurity practices, and orders the review of 
current cybersecurity regulatory requirements.  
Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), 
released at the same time as EO 13636, replaces 
HSPD-7 and dictates three strategic imperatives for 
the US Federal Government and critical 
infrastructure.  First, PPD-21 refines the relationships 
between the US Federal Government, critical 
infrastructure, and State, Local, Tribal, and 
Territorial (SLTT) Governments, in order to facilitate 
better information sharing and collaboration.  The 
second strategic imperative is the identification of 
requirements to enable the timely, efficient, and 
secure exchange of information between all levels of 
governments and critical infrastructure owners and 
operators.  Finally, PPD-21 “calls for the 
implementation of an integration and analysis 
function for critical infrastructure that includes 
operation and strategic analysis on incidents, threats 
and emerging risks.” [5] 
The aforementioned Presidential Directives and 
Executive Order have been focused on information 
sharing between levels governments and critical 
infrastructure.  However, one important piece of the 
information sharing puzzle has been left out, private 
sector cybersecurity information sharing.  EO 13691 
builds on EO 13636 and PPD-21 in order to address 
private sector cybersecurity information sharing by 
encouraging the development and formation of 
Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations 
(ISAOs). [6]  EO 13691 specifies that ISAOs may be 
established as for-profit or nonprofit entities, and 
ISAO members may consist of private or public 
sector entities, or both.  The Executive order calls for 
creation of ISAOs in order to promote cybersecurity 
information sharing within the private sector, 
between the private sector and the government, and 
between ISAOs. 
EO 13691 instructs DHS to fund the creation of 
the “ISAO Standards Organization (SO), which shall 
identify a common set of voluntary standards or 
guidelines for the creation and functioning of 
ISAOs.” [6]  The standards developed by the ISAO 
SO are required to address the baseline services 
offered by ISAOs, and must, at a minimum address 
“contractual agreements, business processes, 
operating procedures, technical means, and privacy 
protections.” [6] 
Several provisions to protect privacy and civil 
liberties are present in EO 13691.  The executive 
order specifically instructs the ISAO SO to include 
privacy protections, such as minimization, in the 
ISAO standards.  Additionally, federal agencies 
engaged in activities under EO 13691 are directed to 
coordinate their activities “with their senior agency 
officials for privacy and civil liberties and ensure that 
appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties 
are incorporated into such activities.” [6] 
Additionally, the ability of the government to 
engage in private-public cybersecurity information 
sharing between with ISAOs is improved by EO 
13691. The National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) is 
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directed to coordinate and collaborate with ISAOs on 
cybersecurity information sharing.  The NCCIC is 
also designated as a critical infrastructure protection 
program and is given the authority to enter into 
voluntary agreements with ISAOs. 
 
 
 
2. EO 13691 and the ISAO SO  
 
As a result of EO 13691, DHS released a call for 
proposals to create the ISAO Standards Organization.  
A team from UTSA, LMI, and the Retail 
Cybersecurity Intelligence Sharing Center (R-CISC) 
was selected from the proposals submitted.  Based on 
the details in the call for proposals and EO 13691, the 
ISAO SO has identified its mission as: 
 
Improve the Nation’s cybersecurity posture by 
identifying standards and guidelines for 
robust and effective information sharing and 
analysis related to cybersecurity 
risks/incidents and cybersecurity best 
practices. 
 
There are some foundational objectives that the 
ISAO SO established early.  First, the documents 
produced must account for a wide range of potential 
ISAOs.  A one-size-fits-all approach will not work 
for the robust ecosystem that it is envisioned for the 
ISAOs.  The goal is to be as all-inclusive as possible 
so that any organization or individual that wants to 
participate in the cybersecurity information sharing 
program can do so. 
A second principle is that the development of the 
documents is conducted in an open collaborative 
manner.  Public comment will always be sought and 
anybody can participate in the public forums that are 
held periodically throughout the process.  The actual 
documents are developed utilizing several working 
groups made up of volunteers interested in 
participating in the creation of the documents that 
emerging ISAOs will use.  The entire process is 
conducted in a very public, open manner. 
The third principle is one that has proven to be 
very critical.  From the start, the standards and 
guidelines have been intended to be voluntary.  There 
will not be a requirement for anybody to form or be 
part of an ISAO if they do not want to be part of one.  
As a result of interactions with government 
departments and the regulator community, some in 
industry have been concerned that participation in an 
ISAO may become mandatory within certain sectors.  
While the ISAO SO cannot prevent the federal 
government from creating laws that might move in 
this direction, the documents are currently being 
developed assuming a completely voluntary model.  
In fact, the ISAO SO sees part of its role as 
representing the views of the public and emerging 
ISAOs to various government agencies, ensuring that 
the public has an opportunity to provide input before 
laws or regulations are created in the information 
sharing space. 
The final guiding principle is that documents that 
describe methods to conduct information sharing will 
take into account the need for confidentiality and 
privacy.  Organizations who are members of an ISAO 
will want to ensure that any sensitive company 
information they share with that ISAO will remain 
confidential.  Similarly, the privacy of individuals 
should be protected so that no personally identifiable 
information is released to individuals who do not 
have a need to view it.   
It needs to also be pointed out that the ISAO SO 
recognized early in the process that, unlike other 
standard development organizations, standards will 
make up just one type of document that will be 
produced.  EO 13691 states: “ISAO Standards 
Organization (SO), … shall identify a common set of 
voluntary standards or guidelines for the creation and 
functioning of ISAOs pointing out definitively that 
more than just standards are expected.  In fact, it is 
believed that the ISAO SO will produce many more 
documents other than what is traditionally viewed as 
standards.  These other documents may include 
discussions about what an ISAO is, how to form one, 
guidelines for what to consider in terms of services 
an ISAO may want to offer to its members, and 
templates for documents that may commonly be 
needed by an ISAO.   
The ISAO SO formed six working groups to 
address various aspects of an ISAO and its creation.  
These working groups are made up of volunteers 
from government, academia, and industry and have 
been tasked with the actual creation of the documents 
that will be released by the ISAO SO.  The six 
working groups are: 
Working Group 1: ISAO Creation – This group 
was tasked with identifying and capturing the 
elements necessary for an interested organization to 
stand up an ISAO. These elements will serve as the 
basis for creating an ISAO and will have enough 
flexibility in design to fit the needs of diverse 
interested organizations. 
Working Group 2: ISAO Services and 
Offerings – Since meeting the needs of its members 
will be critical aspect of all ISAOs, being able to 
determine what the needs are and what capabilities 
are needed to fulfill these needs is critical for all 
ISAOs.  This working group will identify and capture 
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the capabilities necessary for an interested 
organization to effectively operate an ISAO.  These 
services and offerings will support day-to-day 
operation of the ISAO and support its main function: 
to share and receive cyber information in a timely 
and effective manner.  Capabilities must allow for the 
most basic ISAO and also support more sophisticated 
organizations.  Not all ISAOs will provide the same 
capabilities and at least initially there is no definitive 
set of required capabilities for an entity to become 
and ISAO. 
Working Group 3: Information Sharing – 
Obviously what needs to be shared and how will be a 
pressing issue that must quickly be addressed by each 
ISAO.  This group will identify and capture items 
and develop the guidance necessary for an interested 
organization to effectively share cyber information 
(threat indicators, vulnerabilities, and best practices) 
within their ISAO or externally). 
Working Group 4: Privacy and Security – 
There is a lot of concern over the issue of privacy 
(and confidentiality) and how information shared will 
remain secure and not released to individuals or 
organizations that are not authorized access to it.  As 
a result, this working group was established to 
identify and capture the steps to safeguard 
information (both proprietary and privacy related).  
They will also detail the processes and procedures to 
prevent unauthorized release or access to information 
not cleared for release and will address how to meet 
Federal, State, Local, and Tribal laws regarding 
privacy. 
Working Group 5: ISAO Support – This 
working group is quite a bit different from the others 
whose job is the creation of documents to be used by 
individuals and organizations forming an ISAO.  It 
will consist of individuals familiar with the creation 
and operation of information sharing organizations 
who will work to support emerging ISAOs as they 
are created.  This working group will work closely 
with the ISAO SO in providing this assistance to 
emerging ISAOs. 
Working Group 6: Government Relations – 
While the ISAO SO is not a government entity 
(though its funding does come from DHS), the 
federal government will play a significant role in 
information sharing due to its intelligence gathering 
and analysis capability.  This working group will 
identify and address issues associated with ISAO 
interactions with the Intelligence Community, Law 
Enforcement, US Regulators, and Homeland 
Security.  It is expected that this communication will 
go both ways in that this working group will provide 
information to emerging ISAOs on what programs 
exist in the federal government for sharing of 
information with industry or the public but it will also 
provide feedback to the federal government on 
concerns expressed by the ISAOs related to 
government programs or capabilities. 
Each of the groups have been asked to initially 
put together a draft of documents that will be needed 
for emerging ISAOs and that falls within the 
description of their working groups focus.  These 
documents will be combined at their initial release to 
form what is in essence an ISAO Manual.  The initial 
release of this document will not be complete but will 
provide what is immediately needed by emerging 
ISAOs with subsequent versions containing 
additional information.   
 
3. The Information Sharing Ecosystem  
 
As the ISAO SO develops the descriptions to 
allow for a wide range of ISAOs to be created, it 
becomes important to understand how the many 
different types will fit into what is being referred to 
as the Information Sharing Ecosystem.  This is 
designed to explain the many different pieces that 
make up the ecosystem and how they all fit together 
into a unified information sharing program for the 
nation.  The first part of the ecosystem are the 
different categories of ISAOs that may be formed.  
The initial capabilities document created by Working 
Group 2 identifies four major types of ISAOs which 
are: 
Category 1: Individuals or Informal Group 
Based – This category would include: a self-
employed security consultant; a localized group of 
professionals; and a group of security experts rapidly 
convened to address a new vulnerability of incident 
(in other words an issue-driven ISAO). 
Category 2:  Industry or Sector-based – This 
category would include the existing ISACs, and are 
what most individuals think of when ISAOs are 
mentioned.   While some of the ISAOs created in 
Category 1 would be of limited duration, Category 2 
ISAOs will be intended to be permanent (or at least 
for as long as they meet their members’ needs). 
Category 3: Geographically-based – ISAOs in 
this category will cross sector boundaries as they 
consist of all entities wishing to be members who are 
within a specific geographical boundary such as a 
city or state.  
Category 4: Other – This category will consist 
of any ISAO that does not fit neatly into one of the 
other categories.  It will include such entities as for-
profit and not-for-profit ISAO service providers.   
Since the creation of an ISAO is voluntary, it is 
easy to conceive that not all individuals or 
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organizations that are interested in sharing 
cybersecurity information will want to form or join 
an ISAO.  The information sharing ecosystem needs 
to take into account this possibility and allow for a 
mechanism for all who want to participate in 
information sharing to be part of the national 
program.   
A major player in the ecosystem will be several 
agencies within the federal government who are 
engaged in cybersecurity information sharing.  In 
2009, the NCCIC was created in order to analyze 
cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities, share timely 
and actionable information with partners, and manage 
and support response and recovery efforts.  The 
NCCIC partners with the private sector, critical 
infrastructure, SLTT governments, the US federal 
government, and international governments.  The 
NCCIC is a central location that is currently 
comprised of four functional branches: 
 NO&I - NCCIC Operations & Integration 
 US-CERT - United States Computer 
Emergence Reediness Team 
 ICS-CERT - Industrial Control Systems 
Cyber Emergency Response Team 
 NCC - National Coordinating Center or 
Telecommunications 
The premier cybersecurity information sharing 
program by DHS is called the Cyber Information 
Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP) and is 
part of the NCCIC.  Joining the CISCP is free, and 
requires companies to sign a Cooperative Research 
and Development Agreement (CRADA). [7] 
The flow of information in CISCP is bi-
directional. Information shared with DHS is 
analyzed, aggregated, and anonymized and then 
shared with CISCP partners in the form of indicator 
bulletins, analysis reports, priority alerts, and 
recommended practices.  Indicator bulletins are short 
and frequently issued announcements notifying 
partners of new threats that are intended to enable 
fast action.  Analysis reports are an in depth analysis 
of a threat, including the activities of the adversary as 
well as methods for detecting and defending against 
the malicious activity.  Priority alerts are intended to 
provide an early warning for specific significant 
threats. Recommended practices are the result of 
aggregating best practices received from CISCP 
partners. 
Information is shared between CISCP partners 
using the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP).  TLP helps to 
protect sensitive information by clearly defining what 
information may be shared with whom. [8]  
Information shared using TLP is assigned a specific 
color by the originator of the information: 
 RED – The information is extremely 
sensitive and may not be shared with anyone 
outside of the specific exchange. 
 AMBER – The information sensitive and 
should only be shared with members of the 
recipient’s organizations that must have the 
information in order to act on it. 
 GREEN – The information is useful and may 
be shared with any participants. 
 WHITE – There is no or minimal risk of 
misuse and the information may be 
distributed to anyone. 
A more recently created cybersecurity 
information sharing program provided by DHS and 
NCCIC is called Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS).  
Threat indicators that participants share with the 
NCCIC are shared anonymously with all participants 
without vetting by DHS in order to maintain faster, 
higher volume threat indicator sharing.  DHS may, at 
their discretion, assign the information a reputation 
score if possible.  In addition to participant developed 
indicators, DHS also develops and shares its own 
cyber threat indicators with AIS participants. [9] 
AIS is free for private entities, US federal 
government, STTLT government, ISACs, ISAOs, as 
well as foreign governments and companies.  Entities 
may participate in AIS by setting up the 
infrastructure necessary to connect directly to DHS, 
or by joining an ISAO or ISAC that participates in 
AIS.  Information is shared among participants in 
AIS using Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator 
Information (TAXII), Structured Threat Information 
eXpression (STIX), and CybOX.   
TAXII is a set of specifications are used to define 
how and what cyber threat information is exchanged.  
These specifications are: TAXII overview, services 
specification, message binding specifications (e.g. 
XML), protocol binding specifications (e.g. HTTP), 
query format specifications, and content binding 
reference.  It is up to each group using TAXII to 
decide what specifications best meets their needs.  
TAXII is designed to support sharing structured 
cybersecurity threat information such as STIX. [10] 
STIX is a standardized language that makes use 
of CybOX in order to specify cybersecurity threat 
information.  CybOX is a language for describing 
cyber observables.  STIX is intended to capture the 
full range of possible cybersecurity threat elements 
including observables, indicators, incidents, tactics, 
techniques and procedures, exploit targets, courses of 
action, campaigns, and threat actors. [11] 
 
4. Information Analysis  
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Most of the conversation about ISAOs has 
centered on the sharing of cybersecurity related 
information.  This is an important and necessary first 
step but the real goal is to provide “actionable 
information” to the members of ISAOs.  What is 
meant by this is that just sharing raw data or even 
facts about specific incidents does not immediately 
benefit a member of an ISAO.  What members want 
is an analysis of all of the information gathered and a 
distillation of it down to a point that what they 
receive is information that they can take action on.  
They want to know what it is that they need to be 
doing as a result of the information that has been 
shared and not simply the large collection of shared 
information itself.  This will be a major feature of the 
ISAOs and the real benefit that they will provide.  It 
is also where the commercial entities that are forming 
to deliver ISAO services can play a critical role. 
As in the information sharing aspect of an ISAO, 
the amount of analysis will vary between the ISAOs.  
While to be considered an ISAO some level of 
analysis needs to be accomplished, how detailed that 
analysis is will depend on the objectives of the 
individual ISAOs and on their services and offerings.  
For the more informal ISAOs the analysis could 
simply take the form of an email, teleconference, or 
simply a bulletin sent to all members.  The important 
element is again that what is sent should be pertinent 
to the members of the ISAO and should discuss what 
the members should be doing as a result of the shared 
information and analysis. 
At the other end of the spectrum, an advanced 
ISAO might conduct real-time analysis of ongoing 
events and shared information.  The ISAO may 
employ 24x7 analysts and a Security Operations 
Center that monitors the status of the Internet as it 
relates to the ISAO members.  This again is a place 
where potential ISAO service providers could greatly 
benefit their ISAO clients since it will be quite 
expensive to maintain a 24x7 operation center with 
security analysts.   
While an ISAO service provider with its own 
security analysts will have the ability to determine 
what information is critical for the members of an 
ISAO, the various federal agencies involved in 
information sharing and analysis have access to 
information that the commercial entities will often 
not have.  Though some of the service providers may 
argue the opposite is also true, it is hard to argue with 
the fact that the various intelligence gathering 
agencies of the federal government have resources 
that most commercial entities do not have access to.  
Sharing of information with the organizations the 
federal government has set up to participate in 
information sharing efforts can provide a level of 
analysis and access to information that otherwise may 
not be possible.  ISAOs should therefore seriously 
consider participating with the programs to share 
more detailed and analyzed information established 
by these federal agencies.  In order to participate, 
ISAOs will generally be required to agree to a certain 
level of vetting by the federal agency.   
For some, submitting to the vetting of their 
organization or their members is not something that 
they want to do.  Indeed, there are many who may not 
want to share any of their information with a 
government entity at all.  Whether this is done or not 
is up to the individual ISAOs and their members and 
the decision to do so is completely voluntary – there 
is no requirement to share with the federal 
government if the ISAO and its members do not wish 
to share.  The hesitation to share, not only with the 
federal agencies but with other ISAOs or even 
between members of a specific ISAO is often 
centered around the desire to ensure privacy and 
confidentiality of information.  This is one of the 
challenges facing emerging ISAOs. 
 
5. Challenges Facing the ISAOs  
 
There are a number of challenges facing 
organizations and individuals wishing to form an 
ISAO and that face the entire information sharing 
ecosystem itself.  Among these challenges are 
privacy and confidentiality, trust, scalability, 
certification of ISAOs, the willingness to share 
information, and the funding of ISAOs.  An emerging 
ISAO will have to address each of these issues. 
Concerns around privacy and confidentiality of 
information shared is a major concern to 
organizations wanting to participate in an ISAO.  
They want to be assured that any information that an 
organization shares with others, no matter who those 
others are (i.e. other members, other ISAOs, and/or 
federal agencies involved in information sharing 
programs), will be kept private and confidential and 
only released to individuals or organizations that 
have a right to have access based on the agreements 
that are signed by members of an ISAO.  For 
purposes of this discussion, the difference between 
privacy and confidentiality is that privacy is generally 
used in the context of information sharing to mean 
personal information about individuals within a 
member organization should remain private.  
Confidentiality refers to information about the 
organizations – information that might give others a 
competitive advantage should the information 
become public or known to a competitor.  How 
sensitive this issue is can be seen in the debate that 
2413
surrounded the passing of the Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing Act (CISA) in the United States 
in 2015.  The act was ultimately passed but there was 
some significant opposition to it based on the belief 
that compliance with the act would provide the 
federal government access to personal information 
they would otherwise not have had access to.  
Subsequent clarification of the provisions of the act 
have shown that these concerns were not justified as 
the act provided clear guidance on the “scrubbing” of 
personal information before any information was 
shared with the government.  Nonetheless, the debate 
that surrounded the passing of the act provides an 
indication of just how sensitive of a subject this is. 
Trust is another issue that will have to be 
addressed by all parties involved in the information 
sharing ecosystem.  The concern is what level of trust 
can be placed in the information that has been 
received from another part of the ecosystem.  How 
reliable is the information that has been shared?  Do 
the individuals that have provided the information 
have a level of expertise to truly understand what 
they have reported or is the information they 
provided an incorrect understanding of a specific 
situation?  Is it possible for deliberately false or 
misleading information to be inserted into the 
ecosystem?  If organizations within an ISAO do not 
need to be vetted, then is there the possibility that an 
ISAO will be formed by individuals hostile to the 
information sharing ecosystem and that may then 
inject false or misleading information which could 
impact the actions of others?  While the fact that 
these issues are something that needs to be addressed 
is well understood, currently the ISAO SO and its 
working groups have not developed any guidance on 
how trust will be handled.  Currently information 
shared between ISAOs and federal agencies that have 
vetted them are considered to be reliable, as well as 
information shared between ISAOs that have 
established a relationship of trust.  Further trust is left 
up to the ISAOs themselves though guidance on this 
will be forthcoming. 
Some have suggested that a vetting process or 
certification of the ISAOs would handle issues of 
trust and would provide a level of confidence that 
procedures to protect privacy and confidentiality of 
information are in place.  While this may be true, the 
original guidance provided to the ISAO SO is that 
ISAOs should be able to self-certify.  This obviously 
impacts the level of trust that can initially be placed 
in any given ISAO.  The guidance from the ISAO SO 
will allow for self-certification but also being 
examined is whether another level of certification 
would be beneficial to the program and if so, how 
will this certification process be conducted?  
Scalability is an issue that can be immediately 
seen when discussing the possibility of 100’s or 
1000’s of ISAOs emerging.  Add to this the fact that 
any given individual or organization could potentially 
be a member of multiple ISAOs and the possibility of 
an overwhelming amount of information being 
entered into the ecosystem becomes a real issue.  An 
overwhelming amount of information will do nothing 
to enhance the security of the nation but could in fact 
have a negative impact on its overall current security 
status.  Initially the ISAO SO is suggesting that this 
issue be addressed at the individual ISAO level.  In 
other words, member organizations should not be the 
ones that have to face an overwhelming amount of 
information but rather the ISAOs themselves.  The 
members should always only be receiving actionable 
information from the ISAO they are a member of.  
How the ISAOs will handle the potential for too 
much information is an issue that is being addressed 
by the ISAO SO but for which there is no current 
guidance. 
 Probably the most basic of issues that the ISAOs 
have to overcome is an understanding of why it is 
important to share information.  For those who have 
been heavily involved in cybersecurity for years this 
is not as much of an issue, the value of sharing is 
fairly clearly understood.  Those who do not have an 
understanding of the importance, however, need to be 
convinced that sharing information about security 
indicators and incidents will ultimately be beneficial.  
If for no other reason than today it may be one 
organization that gets hit, tomorrow it may be a 
different organization that first discovers an ongoing 
breach.  If everybody shares, then today one 
organization may be the beneficiary of such sharing 
while tomorrow it may be somebody else.  The other 
important thing to emphasize is that sharing of 
information does not mean a wholesale sharing of all 
information about the security status of a company.  
Reports can, and should, be sanitized to highlight the 
necessary items and not provide confidential 
information about a company or its security controls. 
The final issue to mention here is a less technical 
one but one that will be critical for emerging ISAOs.  
This is the funding of ISAOs.  The ISACs generally 
charge a membership fee for an organization to 
receive information for that sector.  Organizations 
within that sector can determine whether there is a 
sufficient value proposition for them to pay that 
membership fee.  The much more all-inclusive nature 
of ISAOs will lead to less formal ISAOs which may 
not charge a membership fee.  The fee provides for 
the funding of full-time analysts and support 
personnel.  If this level of support is not needed based 
on the objectives of a specific ISAO, then funding 
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may not be needed and a membership fee may not be 
required.  On the other hand for members that want 
more real-time intensive analysis and actionable 
information, the more full-time staff or paid services 
will be required.  This may impact the services and 
offerings that an ISAO develops as some ISAOs 
whose membership includes a majority of small 
businesses may not be able to charge fees sufficient 
to support more extensive analysis services.  This 
will be up to the individual ISAOs to determine. 
 
6. Current Status  
 
Since the selection of the team to implement the 
ISAO SO in October 2015 a lot has been 
accomplished.  Two major tasks faced the SO at the 
outset: 1) to analyze the work that had already 
occurred in the ISACs that have been in operation for 
more than a decade and the multiple meetings that 
were held on the subject of information sharing and 
analysis before the selection of the SO; and 2) to 
establish the working groups that would be the 
‘workhorse’ for the SO and would be the entities that 
would actually develop the standards, guidelines, and 
other documents.  The SO got a quick start by 
holding the first of four open, public forums within 
45 days of when the grant was awarded.  This initial 
meeting, held in Tysons, VA, brought individuals 
interested in cybersecurity information sharing 
together to discuss what had already occurred in the 
space and to begin to identify the working groups that 
would be formed.   
The next public forum was held in San Antonio, 
TX, and the most significant part of this meeting was 
the opportunity for the recently established six 
working groups to meet and discuss their way ahead.  
Following this meeting the working groups began the 
real work on the first draft documents which were 
released for public comment before the 3rd public 
forum which was held in Anaheim, CA in May.  
Between this 3rd meeting and the 4th meeting, held 
back in Tysons, VA in August, the second call for 
public comments on the draft documents occurred.  
The working groups then considered each of the 
public comments received and created the final 
version of the initial documents which was released 
in September, 2016.   
The initial draft documents (which were 
developed individually by the different working 
groups but which were then combined into a unified 
document for the September release) consisted of the 
following: 
 
1. The ISAO categories and capabilities 
2. A model for ISAO interaction 
3. Information collection and dissemination  
4. An examination of ISAO security and 
privacy issues 
5. An examination of federal government 
programs and services related to information 
sharing and analysis 
 
 In addition to these documents, a support and 
mentoring infrastructure and process was put into 
place to assist emerging ISAOs to establish 
themselves.   
The initial set of capabilities was not considered 
to be a definitive list.  What it conveyed were 
thoughts about what capabilities an ISAO might want 
to consider when being established. Further services 
and services and offerings will be added as they are 
identified which may occur in the next year or may 
be added when new technology or approaches are 
developed well into the future.  The ISAO program is 
an ongoing effort without a programmed end date. 
Even before the release of the initial document(s), 
the ISAO SO began to receive requests by 
individuals and organizations to establish new 
ISAOs.  An outreach and stakeholder engagement 
program along with a support function and 
mentorship program, were established to work with 
these new entities and to publicize the SO and to 
advertise the method under which new ISAOs could 
be created.  At this point, the formation of ISAOs is 
moving forward along with the establishment of the 
conceptual information sharing ecosystem.  As 
expansion continues, work will be accomplished to 
address the issues previously mentioned as they arise. 
 
7. Future Timeline and Work  
 
While much has been accomplished in the year 
since the creation of the ISAO SO, much still needs 
to be accomplished.  The challenges previously 
mentioned needs considerable work to establish the 
information sharing ecosystem that all may 
participate in.  The scalability issue and what 
information needs to be shared are tied together since 
ISAOs want to share only the minimum amount of 
information in order to be able to provide the 
actionable information their members’ desire.  This is 
the major issue that needs further work in the future – 
devising a plan for sharing information across all 
categories of ISAOs across the entire ecosystem will 
be a considerable challenge in the future. 
Another goal in the future is the expansion of the 
number of ISAOs and an expansion of the 
membership in existing ISAOs.  Ultimately we want 
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everybody to be part of the ecosystem at some level.  
Their choice will be at what level they will want to 
participate in sharing of information. 
The current ISAO effort within the United States 
has sidestepped the issue of the international nature 
of cybersecurity.   Participation of multi-national 
corporations in information sharing is understood.  
This is already occurring.  What has not been 
addressed by the ISAO SO and its working groups is 
an examination of the laws and requirements in 
different countries for privacy, confidentiality, and 
the reporting of incidents.  Instead, the way the 
current documents have been developed is to 
emphasize those issues that are considered core 
information sharing and analysis leaving country-
specific items to appendices which can be added as 
additional countries examine the core principles and 
how they relate to each additional country or region.  
The focus thus has been on aspects of information 
sharing and analysis that is common across 
international boundaries. 
Finally, the initial grant called for a 5-year effort 
but it was quickly realized that for the ISAOs to 
survive beyond the 5-year point some long-term 
structure needs to be developed with consistent 
funding to ensure that future technology that may 
impact the current thought on information sharing 
and analysis along with changes to laws that might 
impact certain countries would need to be 
incorporated into the guidance that had been 
produced.  Who will be responsible for the long-term 
sustainment of the ISAO effort? 
 
8. Conclusion  
 
The benefit of cybersecurity information sharing 
to prevention, detection, response, and recovery to 
cybersecurity incidents has been adequately shown 
through the decade-long effort of the current ISACs.  
ISACs alone, however, do not cover the entire 
landscape of organizations within the country that 
need to be participating in information sharing.  This 
has prompted the development of a standards 
organization to address standards and guidelines that 
emerging ISAOs will need to incorporate.  The ISAO 
SO is this organization and it is utilizing working 
groups in an open, collaborative, and very public 
program to develop the documents needed.  This is 
an on-going effort though the initial set of documents 
has been created.  Much still remains to be 
accomplished, and the working groups continue to 
expand on the documents that have already been 
developed. 
The process being utilized is an open, public, 
collaborative effort and anybody who wishes to be 
part of the effort may volunteer to be on one of the 
working groups, attend one of the open forum 
meetings that are held to provide a forum for the 
public to raise concerns or questions about what is 
being developed, or through the online comment 
process that allows anybody to provide feedback on 
the documents that have been developed – especially 
during the draft comment phase of the effort.  More 
information can be found at www.ISAO.org. 
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